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Changes in epistemology in biosciences are generating important spatial effects. The 
most notable of these is the emergence of a few ‘Bioscience Megacentres’ of basic 
and applied bioscience (molecular, post-genomic, proteomics, etc.) medical and 
clinical research, biotechnology research, training in these and related fields, 
academic entrepreneurship and commercial exploitation by clusters of ‘drug 
discovery’ start-up and spin-off companies, along with specialist venture capital and 
other innovation system support services. Large pharmaceutical firms that used to 
lead such knowledge generation and exploitation processes are becoming increasingly 
dependent upon innovative drug solutions produced in such clusters, and Megacentres 
are now the predominant source of such commercial knowledge. ‘Big pharma’ is 
seldom at the heart of Megacentres such as those the paper will argue are found in 
about four locations each in the USA and Europe, but remains important for some risk 
capital (‘milestone payments’), marketing and distribution of drugs discovered. The 
reasons for this shift (which is also spatial to some extent) are as follows: first, 
bioscientific research requires the formation of ‘collaboratory’ relationships among 
hitherto cognitively dissonant disciplines – molecular biology, combinatorial 
chemistry, high throughput screening, genomics, proteomics and bioinformatics to 
name a few. Second, the canonical ‘chance discovery’ model of bioscientific research 
is being replaced by ‘rational drug design’ based on those technologies because of the 
need massively to reduce search costs and delivery timeframes. Third, the US and to 
some extent European ‘Crusade against Cancer’ and other pathologies has seen major 
increases in basic research budgets (e.g. to $27.3 billion in 2003 for the US National 
Institutes of Health) and foundation expenditure (e.g. $1billion in 2003 by the UK’s 
Wellcome Trust; $1 billion approximately by the top ten US medical foundations, and 
a comparable sum from corporate foundations). Each of these tendencies weakens the 
knowledge generation role of ‘big pharma’and strengthens that of Megacentres. But 
the process also creates major, new regional disparities, which some regional 
governances have recognised, causing them to develop responsibilities for regional 
science policy and funding to offset spatial biases intrinsic in traditional national (and 
in the EU, supranational) research funding regimes. Responses follow a variety of 
models ranging from market following to both regionalised (decentralising by the 
centre) and ‘regionalist’ (ground-up), but in each case the role of Megacentres is 
justified in health terms. But their role in assisting fulfilment of regional economic  
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Introduction 
 
The crucial matter of interest to this paper is the rapid decline in the capabilities of 
large pharmaceuticals companies (‘big pharma’) to develop in-house new therapeutic 
drug treatments, particularly those deriving from biotechnology, compared to the 
rapid rise in that precise capability on the part of networks of small, dedicated 
biotechnology firms (DBFs). This is commented upon in Orsenigo et al., (2001) but 
these authors remain reluctant to see the facts they observe as a weakness of ‘big 
pharma’. Rather, the latter is seen retaining power through its control over the former 
through financing R&D contracts with milestone payments and licensing agreements, 
managing due diligence, and marketing and distributing final treatments or drugs. In 
this contribution we will present the shift in tacit and exploration knowledge to DBFs 
as signifying a crisis for multinational drug companies. For while some other kinds of 
multinational corporations adopted a strategy of downsizing central laboratories and 
decentralising R&D both to branches and to the supply chain (e.g. Dupont’s major 
reduction in its central Wilmington facility; GE’s restructuring of Schenectady’s role; 
and the fact that aerospace firms like Bombardier of Canada routinely buy all R&D 
from a globally dispersed market; Niosi, 2002), such attenuation of the R&D function 
has not been sought by pharmaceuticals firms, but rather represents a failure to deal 
with a thoroughgoing paradigm shift. The paper will examine the nature of that shift 
and explore ways in which some ‘big pharma’ is seeking to manage its response. 
 
The paper has four key sections: 
•  The first examines the knowledge management mechanisms by which DBFs 
tackle the R&D or ‘drug discovery’ process and determine the nature of their 
specific advantage,  
•  The second assesses the adequacy of these mechanisms and how industry and 
intermediaries judge they need to be strengthened, 
•  The third examines the future of big pharma concerning the cognitive 
paradigm shift linking ‘Mode 2’ knowledge production (Gibbons et al., 1994), 
the demise of ‘discovery’ methods and rise of ‘rational drug design’, and fine 
chemistry versus molecular biology,   4
•  The fourth investigates regional development and management control issues 
arising from clustering of advanced bioscientific knowledge exploration and 
exploitation in a few globally significant ‘megacentres’. 
Reference will also be made to a previous paper’s findings that the ‘bioscience 
megacentre’ process is leading to the emergence of a new type of regional policy 
called regional science policy that seeks to overcome the traditional centralising 
features of nationally formulated science policies (and in the EU, supranational RTD 
or research and technology policy). 
  
2. Theoretical Approach 
 
In the broadest terms, the theoretical approach informing the proposed paper dates at 
least from Marshall (1918) and more recent transaction costs theory (Coase, 1937) as 
developed by Penrose  (1959) and Richardson (1972) with their ‘resource’ and 
‘capabilities’ perspective on the firm, rather than the more orthodox neoclassical 
theorems of Williamson (1985). This chimes also with Piore & Sabel’s (1984) 
‘flexible specialisation’ conception of the advantages of small firm networks in 
successfully attacking global markets. More recently authors such as Teece & Pisano 
(1998) and Best (2001) have explored the ‘capabilities’ perspective in theoretical and 
empirical depth. 
 
Marshall’s initial statement was that small firms gained dynamic externalities 
(nowadays more commonly referred to as ‘spillovers’, including ‘knowledge 
spillovers’, see Audretsch, & Feldman, 1996; Feldman & Audretsch, 1999) from co-
location. These gave advantage in terms of specialised skills pools, opportunities for 
production specialisation and technical or managerial knowledge transfer. These 
circulated rapidly due to socio-cultural factors like trust, customs, social ties and other 
institutional characteristics of ‘industrial districts’. Porter’s (1990; 1998) notion of 
‘clusters’ owes much to these insights, as he readily admits. 
 
However, through the twentieth century, such thinking became heterodox and other 
aspects of Marshall’s contribution to economic theory, notably marginalism and 
equilibrium theory, resonated better with the rise to power of the large corporation 
and, within economics, theories explaining the superiority of economies of scale over   5
economies of scope (Chandler, 1990). Piore & Sabel’s (1984) discovery of a Neo-
Marshallian school of economic theory purporting to explain not the anachronistic but 
globally competitive existence of modern industrial districts in Italy (e.g. Becattini, 
1989; Brusco, 1989) in terms that included superior knowledge circulation and 
management among small firms, caused revision to prevailing orthodoxy. 
 
This paper will explore from a firm-capabilities and, innovatively, an institution-
capabilities perspective, the modes by which DBFs mange complex types of 
knowledge ranging from basic scientific to financial in creating project networks to 
generate and exploit research to develop therapeutic treatments. The extent, and 
degree of formality and informality of involvement by knowledge intermediaries in 
this process as compared to direct contact among peers will be explored. Moreover 
the process management functions and problems of big pharma in the ‘knowledge 
value chain’ from research to financing and final distribution as its control shifts 
downstream will be of key theoretical interest. This is especially pertinent as a test of 
the evolving thesis of transnational corporations becoming ‘hubs’ buying not making 
key services (Stewart, 2001; Best, 2001). The role of knowledgeable intermediaries as 
agents in innovation interactions will also be investigated to refine theory. 
 
Theoretically there are four links connecting the paper’s key interests to the ‘design 
space’ of post-genomics (Stankiewicz, 2002). First, following Polanyi (1966) and 
Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995), there is the interplay of implicit (tacit) and explicit 
knowledge in the project networks formed among firms with distinctive expertise, like 
combinatorial chemistry, high throughput, target-based screening, genomics and 
genomic libraries. The extent this mimics Nonaka & Takeuchi’s (1995) original and 
Stewart’s (2001) recently reviewed ‘SECI Process’ linking ‘Socialisation’, 
‘Externalisation’, ‘Creation’ and back to ‘Internalisation’ in the eliciting of implicit 
knowledge, its formulation as explicit or codified knowledge, followed by its re-
internalisation as tacit knowledge can be explored. In particular, the question as to 
whether there are important differences related to types of knowledge (e.g. 
‘exploration’ versus ‘exploitation’) has to be confronted. 
 
Second, how adequate are the institutional mechanisms by which such interactions are 
managed?  Are they largely informal and inaccurately accounted, where is formality   6
strongest, are  ‘arm’s length’ or market exchanges more or less pronounced than 
‘untraded interdependencies’ (Dosi, 1988)? Third, what response does big pharma 
make, if any, to the shift towards ‘rational drug design’? Are there instances where in-
house capabilities to engage fully with ‘Mode 2’ knowledge production (e.g. through 
acquisition, partnership alliances or attempts to mimic certain conventions more 
commonly associated with DBFs, like stock options for innovative scientists or intra-
preneurship). What distinctive strategies are being pursued? Finally, what are key 
barriers to control for big pharma, and what strategies are pursued to accommodate 
the current deficits in in-house drug discovery? What lessons have been learned from 
past experience and what new lessons are being learned currently to adjust to the 
predominant knowledge value chain relationships and interactions? 
 
Knowledge sources, including tacit/codified, internal/external, contact/intermediary, 
and local/global, are key subjects of inquiry of direct relevance to regional science 
and notions surrounding regional science policy. Number and type of network 
partners, mechanisms for assembling partnerships, types of project and typical 
expertise requirements are important to assess and compare ‘social capital’ versus 
‘arm’s length’ kinds of interaction (Cooke, 2002a).  To help move towards some 
concrete information about this, preliminary research within such networks will be 
drawn from a study being conducted in partnership with a biotechnology incubator 
named Oxford BioTechNet and incubators in Germany (BioM, Munich), Israel 
(Jerusalem Biotechnology Incubator), France (GenoPole, Paris) and Italy (Consorzo 
Ventuno, Sardinia), based on focus-group inquiry sessions with a variety of 
biotechnology project network members exploring the above and related issues in 
great depth, with a view to identification of the emergent knowledge 
exploration/exploitation model, its strengths and weaknesses, in comparative 
perspective, and how weaknesses or gaps might be tackled. The second source of 
information will be secondary information on big pharma companies. This evidence is 
both quantitative and qualitative, concerning R&D performance (input-output 
measures) drugs in development, drug approvals, in-licensing, out-licensing, 
patenting, sub-contracting of R&D, partnerships, alliances, project-management and 
knowledge-management issues.  The capabilities and strategies of big pharma facing a 
‘Mode 2’ knowledge production regime will thus be assessed. 
   7
3. The Capabilities of Dedicated Biotechnology Firms 
 
In the ‘capabilities’ perspective on firms, and, it may be added, regions that are the 
knowledge-embedded platforms in which such firms are rooted, it is dynamic 
capabilities that are the most prized. This is helpful because in the literature on 
‘knowledge spillovers’ it is the dynamic rather than static externalities with which 
they are associated that are equally highly prized (Feldman & Audretsch, 1999). 
There is an interesting debate, dating from the work of Jane Jacobs (1969) about 
whether it is the diversified or specialised nature of capabilities in knowledge 
spillovers that gives the basis for innovatively successful milieux. Jacobs argued in 
favour of diversification, new combinations of capabilities giving rise to cognitive 
progress, something with which Feldman & Audretsch broadly agree. But researchers 
such as Glaeser et al. (1992) and Griliches (1992) stressed the superiority of 
specialisation and the capabilities of fairly narrow ‘communities of practice’ (Seely 
Brown & Duguid, 2000), known elsewhere as ‘epistemic communities’ in delving 
deeply and reasonably rapidly into a particular scientific sub-field. Empirically both 
showed how relatively geographically circumscribed knowledge-exploitation, for 
example through patenting activity actually was. More recently though, Galison 
(1997) moving well beyond the narrow confines of patenting activity such as that 
relied upon by Griliches, showed convincingly that new developments in scientific 
method, broadly consistent with the emergence of ‘transdisciplinarity’ in Mode 2 
knowledge production (Gibbons et al., 1994) are built fundamentally on 
diversification of knowledge. 
 
This feature of contemporary ‘complexity’ in knowledge management specifically 
occurring in industrial clusters is the subject of a path-breaking book edited by Curzio 
& Fortis (2002). In a contribution that focuses precisely upon the issue at hand, the 
following observation is made by one contributor: 
‘…. innovation, and problem solving generally, depend on disciplined 
comparisons of alternative solutions, and these in turn require transforming 
tacit knowledge into what might be called pidgin formalisations: accounts 
sufficiently detailed to be recognisable to those who know the situations to 
which they refer first hand, but sufficiently abstracted from them to be 
accessible to outsiders, from various disciplines,’ (Sabel, 2002). 
   8
However, innovation is not the same as basic science. It can easily be seen that if a 
scientist is collaborating with an entrepreneur, say, in writing a paper that exploits a 
patent, they may or may not have to speak a kind of ‘pidgin’ scientific language to 
each other. But invention, or discovery may well be expected to require the greater 
cognitive precision associated with epistemic communities. Even Seely Brown & 
Duguid (2000) who refer to the importance of communities of practice recognise, 
from their long experience at Xerox PARC in Silicon Valley, that: 
‘A firm, then, will almost always intersect multiple networks of practice. In 
Silicon Valley, for example, some firms will have cross-cutting networks of 
engineering, manufacturing, sales and marketing, and customer service. 
Networks of computer engineers, for example, will run through all the firms 
manufacturing computers’ (Seely Brown & Duguid, 2000) 
 
They imply that these lateral professional links are cognitively less dissonant and 
more smoothly connected even than the distinctive ‘capabilities’ linkages within the 
firm. Hence the superiority of networking in a clustered environment rather than a 
stand-alone competitive posture: 
‘Knowledge seems to flow with particular ease where the firms involved are 
geographically close together. Being in the same area allowed the Apple and 
PARC scientists to meet and exchange ideas informally, paving the way for 
more formal links. Relations between PARC scientists and the Dallas 
engineers were in every sense far more distant’ (Seely Brown & Duguid, 
2000) 
 
Thus it seems that proximity in a cluster is fundamentally important to innovation, 
that is, the stage at which deeply embedded knowledge is being confronted with 
processes of knowledge exploitation and commercialisation.  
 
When scientific method was more disciplinary than it now seems to be, that is in the 
era of Mode 1 knowledge production as Gibbons et al. (1994) refer to it, it is probable 
that specialisation was more important than diversification. But now there is strong 
evidence, in biosciences at least, that it has become more transdisciplinary, as we have 
seen, even at the exploratory R&D point in the ‘knowledge value chain’ (Cooke, 
2002b) let alone the exploitation point in the same chain. Thus even basic research is 
likely to contain a higher incidence of the need for ‘pidgin’ among diverse 
professional scientists and engineers than used to be the case. Orsenigo et al. (2001) 
date this shift in biosciences from about 1992. Thus Griliches and Glaeser were 
publishing their results about specialisation at about the same time that it seems the   9
knowledge development method (epistemology) was changing significantly, 
particularly in biosciences. This in turn, it can be shown related to technological 
changes consequent upon precisely the rapid diversification in cognitive skills brought 
about by the demands of such activities as gene sequencing and the eventual decoding 
of the human genome that ushered in the post-genomic era. 
 
Thus, in a regional ‘megacentre’ to be discussed in more detail in Section 6, that of 
Northern California, it is clear that the biomedical industry relies crucially on 
information and communication technologies (ICT) to decode and synthesise 
bioscientific information. This is drawn from the knowledge-intensive ICT base in 
Silicon Valley, and includes sequencing and screening workstations, photonics and 
optical networking, low-level electrical energy instrumentation, and software among 
many others. This convergence between ICT and bioscience has contributed to 
discoveries in genomics, proteomics, therapeutic cloning and stem cell research, and 
these in turn enable improved treatments for high ranking disease targets like cancer, 
cardiovascular, AIDS, diabetes, and respiratory diseases. But the transdisciplinarity 
also operates within and between specific sub-fields like molecular biology, 
combinatorial chemistry, high throughput screening, genomics and bioinformatics. In 
conducting knowledge exploration multidisciplinary teams of researchers are more 
prominent than before. In conducting knowledge exploitation DBFs in the distinctive 
sub-fields form project-based networks interacting also with ‘star’ scientists and their 
teams.  
 
As Zucker et al. (1999) see it, such projects involve no or few ‘untraded 
interdependencies’, they are strictly business transactions, with contracts, 
confidentiality agreements, time-limits and agreed actions (writing a patent or a paper, 
for example) and outcomes. Other actors will also enter this mise-en-scène at various 
points, as ‘knowledgeable attorneys’, consultants or venture capitalists (Suchman, 
2000). So we may conclude that bioscientific megacentres are realised in the presence 
of a nurturing ‘economic business environment’ consisting of:  (1) the quality of the 
inputs available to firms (e.g. human resources, physical infrastructure, availability of 
information); (2) the availability and sophistication of local suppliers of components, 
machinery and services, and the presence of clusters of related firms; (3) the 
sophistication of local demand for advanced products and processes, including the   10
stringency of regulatory environments; and (4) the rules governing the vitality of 
competition and the incentives for productive modes of rivalry (Porter, Sachs & 
Warner, 2000). The key point to derive from this analysis is that while such 
‘economic business environments’ are not unique to Northern California, they are far 
from ubiquitous. Because they rely on massive sums of public funding, as will be 
shown, a moral dilemma arises for policy makers alert to regional disparities. Should 
they encourage spatial concentration to achieve global excellence or should they 
encourage the development of such facilities in less favoured regions too? Keep in 
mind that the latter are where negative health imbalance is often as pronounced as 
economic weakness in the official statistics. Finally, as health economists and others 
are coming to realise, health services and their supporting supply firms in 
pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and research laboratories contribute as much as one-
sixth of GDP in some advanced economies (Cassidy, 2002).  
 
In Table 1 data are presented on public and private health expenditure in a number of 
leading OECD countries for 1997. These statistics probably underestimate the whole 
 
Table1: Health Expenditure in Leading OECD Countries, 1997 
 
health economy as described above by a few percentage points. Nevertheless they 
demonstrate even core health expenditure running at just under 10% for the G7 
countries, and much higher, at nearly 14% for the USA. 
   11
Statistical data for the USA at regional (State) level reveal just how skewed is the 
distribution of that element of public expenditure covered by State and Federal 
allocations. It should be noted that about half of US public expenditure on health is 
explained as follows: 
‘The system of employer-sponsored coverage emerged to restrain wage 
inflation during World War 2 and afterward continued when the federal courts 
ruled that unions could collectively bargain with employers for benefits, 
including health care coverage. These benefits are considered public sector 
‘tax expenditures’ because they are excluded from workers’ wages for 
purposes of taxation and defined as an untaxed cost of business for employers’ 
(Milbank Memorial Fund, 2000) 
 
Private spending occurs through private insurance taken out by individuals on top of 
whatever workplace-related benefits they receive. Since the 1980s there has been a 
growth in share of the former and a shift from ‘fee-for-service’ indemnity towards 
‘managed care’ in insurance health plans. Health insurance has thus become more 
commoditised, suppliers are keen to raise efficiencies in treatment times, use of new 
technologies, and to reduce casual conduct by physicians of clinical research on 
patients. Companies and consumers are equally keen to achieve value for money 
under circumstances where information to enable assessment is at a premium. There 
has thus been a tendency for geographical concentration of exploration research and, 
due to insurance industry pressure, clinical research in specific General Clinical 
Research Centres. For comparable reasons under a differently funded health insurance 
system in the UK the same kind of concentration into Clinical Research Centres is 
occurring (Cooke, 2002b). 
 
In Table 2 some illustrative data are presented regarding the regional vis à vis Federal 
public expenditure profile for direct health costs, excluding the employers’ ‘public 
tax’ expenditures. Of particular note are the data pointing to California and New York 
States accessing 11% and 12% respectively of the US total for this item. These are, of 
course, large population centres, California being the larger, though it is noticeable 
also that while New York spends 3.9% of its GDP in this way, California only spends 
2.1%. Thus demographics, politics and per capita income also play their part in 
explaining differences in level of expenditure. Among other large health expenditure 
States, but not in the same rank as California and New York, are Texas and   12
Pennsylvania, followed by a group spending around $8-9 billion in 1999, namely 
Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan and Ohio. Of interest are the ways in 
 
 
State    State Funds ($ million) Federal Funds       S/F Ratio   GDP Share 
 
New York  $15,009       $14,860    99%    3.9% 
California  $14,412      $11,981    86%    2.1% 
Texas    $  6,993      $  8,100    115%    2.2% 
Pennsylvania  $  6,723      $  6,110     90%    3.3% 
Florida   $  5,080      $  4,469     80%    2.2% 
Illinois   $  5,536      $  3,860     70%    2.1% 
Massachusetts $  5,125      $  3,279     63%    3.4% 
Michigan  $  4,739      $  4,231     89%    2.9% 
Ohio    $  6,739      $  1,620     24%    2.3% 
New Jersey  $  4,522      $  2,971     66%    3.9% 
 
Table 2: State & Federal Health Expenditure, USA Top Ten, 1999 
Source: Calculated from Milbank Memorial Fund & US Dept. of Commerce, Bureau 
of Economic Analysis 
 
which such budgets are composed such that variance from the US mean GDP share 
per State (2.6%) is relatively small, including the rest, where West Virginia at 4.8% 
on the one hand, and Alaska at 0.6% are among the most significant outliers. With a 
few exceptions, such as Ohio in Table 2, Federal funding makes a significant 
contribution. Texas, like other southern Appalachian and south-western States receive 
more Federal than State disbursements.  
 
However, calculations of such disbursements in relation to State population size show 
New York, at $1,572 per capita, and Massachusetts, at $1,482 to be the most generous 
spenders, Pennsylvania comes next, at $1,070, then New Jersey at $949, Michigan at 
$897 ahead of California at $800, followed by Illinois ($783), Texas ($765), Ohio 
($763) and Florida ($615). Linking back to points made earlier about the increasing 
‘commoditisation’ of health care in the US (and to a growing extent in the UK and 
perhaps elsewhere) States such as these are becoming active purchasers of higher 
quality, more technology-intensive, but also value for money health services. It should 
further be recalled that the statistics under discussion constitute only some 20% of 
total State health care budgets, but represent baseline funding. Clearly, California is   13
less dependent upon public funding than the East Coast States, that category 
accounting for only just over half the GDP share it does in New York and New 
Jersey. As Table 3 shows, California’s ‘mega-budget’ for private health care 
expenditure easily outstrips all others among the entrants in Table 2. Hence the 
 
    State      Personal Health Care Expenditures, 1998 ($mn.) 
 
  California          $110,057 
  New York          $85,785 
  Texas            $67,750 
  Florida           $59,724 
  Pennsylvania          $51,322 
  Illinois           $44,305 
  Ohio            $42,581 
  Michigan          $35,647 
  New Jersey          $32,695 
  Massachusetts         $30,039 
 
Table 3: Personal Health Care Expenditures, Top Ten US States, 1998 
Source: Health Care Financing Administration (2001), Trends in State Health Care 
Expenditure and Funding, 1980-1998, Washington DC. 
 
relatively low share of GDP allocated to direct public expenditure on health is 
compensated for by a massive figure of some 10% of GDP being expended on 
personal health care. 
 
Keeping in mind that Table 2 represents one-fifth of each State’s health expenditure, 
requiring an approximate doubling to include the employer’s contribution, and that 
Table 3 accounts for some three-fifths we see the scale of total investment available 
annually in the leading States’ economies. Thus California spends at least $160 
billion, New York $145 billion and even modestly sized Massachusetts some $46 
billion. Three key points flow from this accounting exercise. First, a few key regions, 
and in fact cities in those regions have the demographic, financial and scientific scale 
to afford the whole of the bioscientific and medical knowledge value chain. This 
moves from the most exploratory, fundamental research into genomics and post-
genomics fields like proteomics and molecunomics. This is likely to be conducted at 
specialist research institutes such as the Whitehead in Cambridge, Massachusetts 
(partnered with the Sanger Institute, in Cambridge, UK and Washington University at 
St. Louis for the Human Genome project). Knowledge of this kind will likely be   14
applied in specalist medical research institutes at universities, like the Dana-Farber 
Cancer Institute at Harvard, or the New England Enzyme Centre at Tufts University, 
Boston. Research in other key fields noted earlier (cancer, cardiovascular, AIDS, 
diabetes, and respiratory diseases) will be conducted in other independent research 
institutes and university research centres like Harvard Medical School’s pre-clinical 
research in Biochemical & Molecular Pharmacology, Cell Biology, Genetics, 
Microbial & Molecular Genetics, and Neurobiology, or affiliates like the Joslin 
Diabetes Centre. Second, such research institutes and centres both attract and train 
Life Sciences talent, giving critical mass to interactive research activity. This, in turn, 
strongly influences growth in funding through competitive bidding to National 
Institutes of Health and National Science Foundation programmes. Third, such 
‘megacentres’ interact with the large hospitals, in which clinical research as well as 
patient treatment occurs along with training of physicians. Massachusetts General 
Hospital and the Brigham & Women’s Hospital in Boston are thus important large-
scale patient-bases for clinical trialling. There is, accordingly a suitable milieu also for 
academic entrepreneurship, which, combined with Boston’s status as a top-three 
location for venture capital and ‘knowledgeable attorneys’ (Suchman, 2000), makes it 
a highly nurturing ‘economic business environment’ for exploitation as well as 
exploration knowledge management in the form of leading biotechnology firms like 
Immunex (recently acquired by Amgen), Biogen, Genzyme, Millennium, 
TransKaryotic Therapies, and others, recently also joined through new openings or 
acquisitions by the likes of Abbott Laboratories, AstraZeneca, Aventis, Pfizer and 
Wyeth (recently merged with American Home Products). 
 
Thus, while scale of expenditure in general health systems clearly matters as an entry 
ticket to the megacentre ‘tournament’, it is by no means a sufficient condition. There 
has also to be world-class science and world-class commercialisation capability. 
There has to be localised ‘social capital’ among the actors present, which can link 
appropriate partners across epistemic community boundaries. Firms help themselves 
when they speak with a single voice on matters of common concern, something 
portrayed in the Boston cluster by the activities of the 280-member Massachusetts 
Biotechnology Council. Much of this system is portrayed in Fig. 1 below. 
  
Fig. 1: The Cambridge, Massachusetts and Greater Boston Biosciences Megacentre  
4. Rational Drug Design & DBF Networks 
 
What are the difficulties faced by DBFs in taking advantage of such nurturing 
economic business environments, and in what ways are those in the USA better 
placed to benefit than those in Europe? One key feature that differentiates them is the 
estimated $20 billion per year that has been available for US biotechnology research 
from Federal investment in, for example, the 1994-98 period studied by Senker & 
Van Zwanenberg (2001). This compares with the approximately €10 billion spent by 
European governments over the same period. Further, it is argued, US DBFs can 
exploit the research findings of National Institutes of Health-funded research more 
swiftly and efficiently due to the existence of National Science Foundation sponsored 
Small Business Innovation Research grants enabling DBFs to develop ideas more 
quickly thus potentially influencing venture capitalists and ‘big pharma’ to invest in 
what elsewhere would appear to be more high-risk ventures. These SBIR grants arise 
from a requirement that R&D spending Federal government departments must spend 
up to 2.5% of their extra-mural research budgets on commissions from SMEs. 
Moreover, research-minded entrepreneurs requiring continuing interaction with other 
discovery firms or research institutes have more of these to choose among and thus 
exploit better networking opportunities. 
 
Jaffe et al.’s (1993) finding that knowledge spillovers from universities to firms were 
relatively regional or even local was found to be true in the Senker & Van 
Zwanenberg research on European biopharmaceutical firms. Exacerbating this, Owen-
Smith et al. (2001) found that public research organisations (PROs), with which such 
DBFs are likely to seek to interact, have far more intensive and extensive inter-
institutional research networks than European firms. The latter had much smaller, 
sometimes dyadic, networks and these were often nationally constricted, except for 
occasional transatlantic contact with a US institute, and consequent potential linkage 
into wider US knowledge networks. However, so few and restricted were the active 
international linkages that less knowledge exploitation was feasible, and more slowly, 
than in the case of the better-networked US institutes. Hence, it can be argued from a  
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‘capabilities’ perspective as outlined in Section 1 of this paper, that the better 
networking for purposes of knowledge exploration and support for knowledge 
exploitation displayed by US research institutes is a sign of superior institutional 
capability. Given their role as key intermediaries in the knowledge management 
process, the institutional capability in the US Biosciences Innovation System, adds 
significant value to an already doubly advantaged initial research resource base. 
 
It can be further shown, as Owen-Smith et al. (2001) go on to do, that US networks 
among PROs are hierarchically structured. Over the period from 1988-1998, the 
Boston cluster has remained at the peak of US interorganisational research linkages, 
and its connections to other clusters has doubled to over 50% of its total contacts over 
the period. San Diego has moved to second place in the hierarchy over San Francisco, 
while Seattle and New York have exchanged positions, Seattle rising above New 
York in terms of the number and strength of its inter-regional PRO linkages. Thus 
relationships between PROs and firms in their clusters are augmented by the 
institutional capabilities of both to benefit from spanning therapeutic areas, engaging 
in multiple stages of the knowledge exploitation value chain, and involving diverse 
collaboration. The institutional system takes on certain characteristics that have 
resulted in the term ‘collaboratory’ being used to describe such interorganisational 
networking. As has been suggested, European DBFs and PROs have tended to engage 
in more attenuated innovation networks, with more specialised than diverse 
interactions, and a more limited external value chain involvement that is also mostly 
national in character. 
 
The weaknesses of European international networks of PROs and DBFs can be 
understood in terms of the relative immaturity of regional science infrastructures. This 
in turn, echoes the relatively small budgets that have traditionally been available for 
systemic medical, health and life sciences research integration. This is changing 
rapidly in some European countries, and has been rather better developed in some 
smaller EU economies for some time. Thus Germany and France have changed 
business regulations to encourage innovation and academic entrepreneurship, while a 
long period of under funding in the UK health service has been reversed both in 
service delivery budgets and scientific research budgets. In the UK, the world’s   18
largest scientific research charity, the Wellcome Trust, has become highly active in 
co-funding with the UK government investments in research infrastructure and basic 
exploration research such as the Human Genome and new post-genomic research at 
such centres of excellence as the Sanger Research Institute at Cambridge (UK). 
 
Nevertheless, some important parts of the exploration and exploitation infrastructure 
remain underdeveloped to varying degrees. In the UK, much emphasis has been 
placed upon funding Centres of Excellence. These are relatively few in number and 
highly imbalanced between regions and within them. In an earlier paper (Cooke, 
2002b) it was shown that implicitly or explicitly policies are set to strengthen specific, 
often potentially or actually multi-purpose, sites with the strongest possibility for 
elaborating a medical and life sciences knowledge value chain to the fullest extent. 
Modelled to some degree on Boston, Cambridge (UK) has been a major recipient of 
Wellcome Trust and UK research council funding, complemented by special Treasury 
funding to enhance academic entrepreneurship through linkage with the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and new investments in hospital 
infrastructure, including a Clinical Research Centre, to fill out its emergent 
megacentre character. It is well known that Cambridge was already the UK’s leading 
biotechnology commercialisation location, consequent on long term cultural change 
efforts to stimulate academic exploitation  of world class exploration knowledge. A 
case in point of the latter is the shift in the Medical Research Council’s Molecular 
Biology Institute from essentially giving away Intellectual Property Rights to 
discoveries like Monoclonal Antibodies as occurred with Milstein and Kohler’s 
discovery, to stimulus for contemporary scientists to become academic entrepreneurs. 
Now the MRC lab has some 30 spinout firms, some like Cambridge Antibody 
Technologies valued in many millions of pounds on the UK’s technology stock 
market. 
 
Yet this process can often be rather unsystematic, as the experience in neighbouring 
Oxford, also home to world-leading medical and life sciences research, and to 
numerous start-up and more mature biotechnology firms like Oxford Glycosciences, 
Oxford Asymmetry and Xenova. A key part of the maturation of exploration into 
exploitation knowledge occurs in incubators. Oxford Innovation, under the wing of 
the Oxford Trust, a non-profit commercialisation institution, runs Oxford   19
BioTechNet, responsible for a number of early and mid-stage start-up biotechnology 
firms. However, such is the relatively precarious nature of the funding needed for 
such businesses that, in reality, it is impossible to posses all the skills required of 
intermediaries such as those found in US megacentres like Boston in one incubator or 
even one small university city. Thus issues of funding, from seedcorn to business 
angel to full-blown venture capital, legal questions, ranging from incorporation to 
patent defence, management issues like in-licensing and out-licensing, development 
of supply chain linkages or milestone payment agreements with ‘big pharma’, and 
more mundane questions of property acquisition as companies grow and leave the 
incubator, are all dealt with by a single incubator manager.  
 
Interestingly, through a research partnership with such well-found innovation 
intermediaries as BioM in Munich and GenoPole in Paris, it is clear that comparable 
difficulties apply in their cases too. That is, finance may not be such a problem as 
finding appropriate expertise. For even though it is said that Munich had some thirty 
venture capitalists in the seven years after BioRegio, the German Federal 
government’s regional biotechnology commercialisation initiative, such is the 
newness of most of the twenty or so new biotechnology firms that special early-stage 
management expertise and support is a greater weakness than investment finance 
(Kaiser, forthcoming). As will be seen below, Munich is now assessed as being 
Europe’s leading high technology cluster, at least in ITC if not biotechnology. But 
while it has a few mature biotechnology firms kike MediGene and MorphoSys, most 
of its start-ups are in their infancy, heavily dependent on public venture finance, and it 
is unclear how viable many are were they to be wholly reliant on even the protected 
regime by which most biotechnology firms survive without showing profitability. 
 
 
This compares rather unfavourably with the picture of relatively healthy research-led 
networking painted by Orsenigo et al (2001) where collaborative relationships among 
firms and research institutions initiated from the US are shown to be diverse, capable 
of including linkage with some of the above-mentioned European firms, and 
sophisticated enough in knowledge management of the revolutionised ‘rational drug 
design’ methodologies consequent upon the revolution in molecular biology 
(Henderson et al., 1999) for ‘big pharma’ to seek entry to the networks rather than   20
vice-versa. The change from a ‘chance discovery’ model of scientific research to a 
‘rational drug design’ model based on combinatorial chemistry, molecular biology, 
high throughput screening, genomics and bioinformatics has meant that those regions 
and localities with clusters of DBFs of various kinds, linked also to ICT firms and 
knowledge management intermediaries are absolutely advantaged, even to the extent 
of making ‘big pharma’ dependent on them for key knowledge of both the exploration 
and exploitation kind. Increasingly such DBFs even manage the due diligence and 
trial management processes, leaving ‘big pharma’ to exchange contracts with the DBF 
networks for the license to market and distribute the hoped-for biopharmaceutical 
drug at the end of the pipeline. 
 
5. Which Are Leading Megacentres and What Is Regional Science Policy? 
 
We have seen already that Boston is perhaps the leading biosciences megacentre, not 
because it has the heaviest medical or even bioscientific research budgets, but because 
it is presently one of, if not the leading centre for exploration research. So much so 
that while the Swiss drug company Novartis announced in 2000 a path-breaking 
agreement to spend $25 million on first access to the results of plant and microbial 
biology research conducted at the University of California, Berkeley, in the heart of 
the Northern California biotechnology cluster, in 2002 Novartis announced the 
establishment of a $250 million Novartis Genomics Research Institute in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts on the grounds that it was the leading exploration and exploitation 
centre for genomics and post-genomics knowledge. Boston’s current primacy has not 
been the product of the operations of the market mechanism alone. In 1999, $770 
million of mainly public or charitable research funding was earned for medical and 
bioscientific research. That figure is likely to have exceeded $1 billion shortly 
afterwards. This was marginally less than the amount of National Institutes of Health 
funding alone passing through the Northern California cluster in 1999, a statistic that 
increased to $893 million in 2000 (CHI/PWC, 2002). Most of the exploration research 
conducted in both Cambridge/Boston and Northern California is conducted in 
institutions that are dependent on public funding, though private research foundations 
are also functional in both. In Boston, the Massachusetts Biotechnology Council is an 
active and successful biotechnology association that lobbies industry and political 
forums at State and Federal levels, pressing for an FDA presence in Boston to offset   21
the advantage enjoyed by emergent firms and research institutes located in Maryland 
near the head offices of both NIH and FDA (see table 4). 
 
Institution         Rank (1994)    Amount ($million) 
 
Program Resources Inc., Reston VA     1      $98.0 
Westat Inc., Rockville, MD        2      $50.0 
Adv. Biosc. Lab Inc, Kensington, MD    3      $30.6 
U. of Alabama, Birmingham, AL      4      $16.2 
Research Triangle Institute, RTC Park, NC    5      $15.1 
Johns Hopkins U., Baltimore, MD      6      $14.6 
ROW Sciences Inc, Rockville, MD      7      $14.5 
Harvard U., Cambridge, MA       8      $13.2 
Southern Research institute, Birmingham, AL  9      $12.9 
U. of Texas Health Science Centre, Houston, TX  10      $11.3 
 
Table 4: Top Ten Institutions for NIH R&D Contracts, 1994 
Source NIH 
 
The figures in Table 4 are somewhat out of date but their significance lies in the 
evidence of a few years ago that geographical proximity explained the largest share in 
the variance of grant allocations by NIH, something that has been changed somewhat 
by the more piecemeal evidence that Johns Hopkins and Harvard Universities now vie 
for top position in consequence of their recognition of various biases in the system 
revealed by the statistics for 1994’s allocations. 
 
Let us look more closely at the manner in which the assets of biosciences megacentres 
like those in Northern and Southern California are now packaged in documentation 
that promotes the image that is intended to appeal to investors of all kinds into the 
regional innovation system. The two following examples, from Northern and 
Southern California are produced by a non-profit association (The California 
Healthcare Institute) and a consultancy (Michael Porter’s Monitor) respectively. The 
California Healthcare Institute is a public policy institute for California’s 200 leading 
biotechnology firms and research institutes. It is thus comparable to the Massachusetts 
Biotechnology Council. Its political brief is expressed clearly by CEO Gollaher who 
despite noting ‘…funding for basic science is strong..’ bemoans the fact that ‘…many 
federal and state lawmakers advocate policies that would impede medical innovation. 
Our greatest threats include a total ban on human cloning ad severe restrictions on 
stem cell research; a Medicare administration that…. effectively excludes new   22
products…. and a leaderless FDA facing the greatest wave of new inventions in 
history’ (Gollaher in CHI/PWC, 2002). The demand is for collaboration among 
members of the biosciences innovation system to change laws that are perceived as 
threatening the evolution of the industry in the post-genomic era. 
 
Northern California is presented as the birthplace of biotechnology, which, along with 
biomedical innovatons like cardiac stents, has a strong base of some 819 
biomedical/biotechnological firms, employing 86,000 people (28,000 in 
biotechnology), total R&D of $1.1 billion, NIH grants of $893 million and $4.1 
billion in worldwide revenues, including $2.7 billion exports.. New infrastructure 
projects include University of California San Francisco Medical School’s new $1.4 
billion Mission Bay bioscience research campus, the new California Institutes for 
Science and Innovation, and the California State University CSUPERB joint ventures 
programme where universities and the private sector collaborate in bioscience 
research, technology transfer, business and even residential development. Much 
emphasis is placed on survey results showing that significant interaction occurs 
among firms and the institutional research base in Northern California.  
 
Thus, California’s academic research institutions are credited with playing a central 
role in the growth of nearly one-third of biomedical/biotechnological firms, 42% of 
firms had at least one research contract with a California research institution, 56% of 
firms planned to broaden or maintain such agreements and up to 70% of firms having 
patent license agreements planned to maintain or broaden them in future. The key 
Northern California life sciences and clinical research institutes cited include Stanford 
University (Biomedical Technology Information Programme), Lawrence Berkeley 
and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, and the University of California, San 
Francisco Medical School, Berkeley (BioSTAR industry-academic collaboration), 
Santa Cruz (with Berkeley, the California Institute for Bioengineering, Biotechnology 
& Quantitative Biomedical Research, QB3) and Davis (Life Sciences Information 
programme). More than 19,000 are employed in research in the region, and nowadays 
two of the top ten NIH R&D grant recipients in the US are UCSF and Stanford. A 
picture of this cluster that is developing the characteristics of a biosciences 
megacentre is presented in www.biospace.com. But the judgement as to whether it yet 
is, is occluded by the lobbying points that although some larger firms such as Abbot   23
Laboratories and Genentech are present, most are SMEs, 49% without products on the 
market, 45% with no revenue in 2000. Finally, of the pharmaceutical pipeline 
products reported, 53% are in preclinical trials. This is by no means unusual, but 
nevertheless testifies to the apparent fragility of the exploitation aspect of the 
Northern California cluster, once its strength, but never adequately backed up with 
strong bioscience exploration capabilities and now, belatedly perhaps, seeking to 
embed them. 
 
 In Southern California, the San Diego biotechnology cluster has larger claims to be 
considered a biosciences megacentre than even that in the North. In Porter’s (2002) 
competitiveness study San Diego’s biopharmaceuticals cluster is presented as long 
established and among the most significant outside Boston, especially for R&D. 
Cluster employment growth was more than 8,000 from 1988-1997 and San Diego had 
the most rapid growth in patent output compared to the twenty largest US 
biotechnology clusters. There are some 400 SMEs, focusing mainly on one or two 
preferred drug targets, the University of California, San Diego, with numerous 
specialist research centres, and finally, some globally known research institutes, the 
Salk Institute, the Scripps Research Institute, the Burnham Institute, and the La Jolla 
Institute for Allergies and Immunology, each focusing upon aspects of life science, 
medical or clinical research. The Scripps Institute, since establishment in the 1950s 
required its researchers to raise their own funds encouraging collaborative innovation 
with larger firms (like Dow). By contrast, the Salk Institute does not conduct 
corporate research but licenses its discoveries and takes equity stakes in companies. 
UCSD emphasised medical research and academic entrepreneurship. One early fruit 
of that approach was Hybritech, a 1978 biotechnology start-up, from which more than 
fifty other local biotechnology DBFs were spun out. In 1986 it was sold to Eli Lilly 
for $400 million. A further feature of this cluster is its strong and long-established 
networking propensity, signified by the establishment since 1985 of the UCSD 
CONNECT network, a model for cluster integration in many other new economy 
clusters such as Scotland’s and Cambridge’s (UK) (ICT) networking associations. 
 
In Fig. 2 an analysis is provided of the origins of the San Diego biotechnology cluster 
firms in relation to the San Diego CONNECT network. It is notable that   24
‘entrepreneurs’ (like the first owners of Hybritech) are far more important sources of 
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Overall, the Lee and Walshok (2001) report concludes that the San Diego 
biotechnology cluster is characterised by the following features: 
•  400+ Companies 
•  248 emergent firms 
•  28,000 employees 
•  UCSD CONNECT – ‘ a network of professional competencies focused on 
building shared knowledge…. for technological companies’ 
•  UCSD, Salk Institute, Scripps Research Institute, Burnham & La Jolla 
Institutes 
•  an innovation support infrastructure of investors, consultants and technology 
intermediaries                                                                                    
The judgement of Porter’s (2002) team is that the close proximity of research centres 
and firms on the Torrey Pines Mesa was a key advantage in encouraging collaboration 
and growth. Regarding patenting San Diego registered 360 patents in 
biopharmaceuticals in 1997, a rate of 13.17 per 1,000 workers and the growth rate 
was the US’s fastest, though the intensity was less than nine other bioclusters. 
Venture capital was invested at a much higher rate than nationally with $421 million 
having been placed 1995-99, nearly 10% of the national total. But research 
organisations are the greatest strength, with Novartis and Dow having joined the 
public institutes, making a total of some 16,000 employees in biopharmaceuticals 
research alone, larger than that specific category in Northern California. However, 
both Californian clusters have strongly emergent megacentre properties, based 
especially on their strength in exploration knowledge and an abundance of SME 
DBFs that are capable of rapidly forming molecular discovery networks due to 
geographical proximity and critical mass. In the Orsenigo et al. (2001) study of 
rational drug design research networks18% of interacting firms and institutes were in 
Boston, 16% in Northern California and 12% in San Diego. The few partners outside 
the USA were located in Munich (2), Cambridge (2) and Oxford (2). 
 
This brings us neatly to brief consideration of the status of bioscience megacentres in 
Europe. In terms of possession of the key exploration and exploitation institutes and 
firms, it is clear from maps produced regularly by Ernst & Young, e.g. (1999) that the 
greater London area has the greatest number of DBFs concentrated in an 
agglomeration with few exploration institutions south and west of London and two 
clusters at Cambridge and, slightly smaller, Oxford where exploration and exploitation   26
go hand in hand in geographical proximity. Cambridge has the strongest case for being 
considered a potential megacentre at present. Cambridge has a rather diverse 
biotechnology processing and development as well as services support structure, even 
though the industry is relatively young and small.  Some of the service infrastructure 
and perhaps the equipment sector benefits from the earlier development of Information 
Technology businesses, many also spinning out from university research in 
Cambridge. The infrastructure support for biotechnology in and around Cambridge is 
impressive, much of it deriving from the university and hospital research facilities.  
The Laboratory of Molecular Biology at Addenbrookes Hospital, funded by the 
Medical Research Council; Cambridge University’s Institute of Biotechnology, 
Department of Genetics and Centre for Protein Engineering; the Babraham Institute 
and Sanger Institute with their emphasis on functional genomics research and the 
Babraham and St. John’s incubators for biotechnology start-ups and 
commercialisation, are all globally-recognised facilities, particularly in 
biopharmaceuticals.  However, in the region are also located important research 
institutes in the field of agricultural and food biotechnology, such as the Institute for 
Food Research, John Innes Centre, Institute of Arable Crop Research and National 
Institute of Arable Botany. Its core biotechnology industry consists of approximately 
90 firms and the broader cluster (venture capitalists, patent lawyers etc.) consists of 
approximately 200 firms, with the core biotechnology firms employing 2,500-3,000 
people. Of relevance to the biotechnology community are the activities of the Eastern 
Region Biotechnology Initiative.  This biotechnology association is the main regional 
network with formal responsibilities for: newsletters, organising network meetings; 
running an international conference; web-site; sourcebook and database on the 
bioscience industry; providing aftercare services for bio-businesses; making intra- and 
inter-national links (e.g. Oxford, Boston, San Diego); organising common purchasing; 
business planning seminars; and government and grant-related interactions for firms. 
 
Munich seems to have become a more significant biotechnology player in recent 
times, particularly since the onset of BioRegio in 1995. It was well established in 
exploration knowledge institutions but like the rest of Germany, weak in exploitation 
mechanisms. This seems to have been re-balanced but it is  too soon to say how 
significantly as key second-round funding demands are only in 2002 coming on-
stream. The science base in Munich is broad, but with special expertise in health-  27
related and agricultural and food biotechnology. There are three Max Planck Institutes 
of relevance, in Biochemistry, Psychiatry and the MPI Patent Agency.  GSF is the 
Helmholtz Research Centre for Environment and Health, and the German Research 
Institute for Food Chemistry is a Leibniz Institute.  There are three Fraunhofer 
Institutes, one of Germany’s four Gene Centres, two universities and two 
polytechnics.  The main research-oriented ‘big pharma’ companies are Roche 
Diagnostics (formerly Boerhinger Mannheim) and Hoechst Marion Roussel (since 
2000, Aventis).  The work areas of this science community include; 3D structural 
analysis, biosensors, genomics, proteomics, combinatorial chemistry, gene transfer 
technologies, vaccines, bioinformatics, genetic engineering, DNA methods, primary 
and cell cultures, microrganisms, proteins, enzymes and gene mapping.  The Bavarian 
commitment to biotechnology (and other new technologies) was realised through its 
state government decision to privatise its share in power-generation and distribution 
companies in the 1990s, thereby creating a funding  pool to subsidise applied 
technology developments. Nevertheless, the numbers of start-ups are not 
overwhelming, perhaps because of the quest for ‘quality’ start-ups in whom 
substantial sums may be individually invested.   
 
A further explanation for conservatism is that BioM AG, the ‘midwife’ agency to the 
cluster, funded partly by BioRegio and set up as a corporation, makes investments 
with its shareholders’ (state, industry and banks) money.  Banks seeking to earn high 
returns hold most of the shares.  They also use this method to learn about 
biotechnology, its risks and prospects.  Thus, an already well-subsidised system is 
further protected from risk by the influence of banking culture, itself highly 
conservative in Germany, to ensure, as far as possible, risk avoidance.  Hence, while 
BioM is the network face of the biotechnology cluster in Munich, its activities are 
ultimately orchestrated indirectly and directly by the banks, abetted by a fairly risk-
averse, mostly publicly-funded, venture capital industry and the local pharmaceutical 
and chemical companies (Giesecke, 2000). 
 
So, for the moment Europe’s best candidates (to which may possibly be added 
Stockholm-Uppsala in Sweden, VINNOVA, 2001) are either somewhat lacking in the 
maturity or critical mass of their DBFs, as is the case to varying degrees of both 
Cambridge and Munich. This is an  exploitation rather than  exploration knowledge   28
deficiency. It is arguable, judged by Nobel Prizes awarded that Cambridge with 
eleven is superior in biosciences to any of the stronger candidates in the USA. But it 
is unquestionable that the latter have been more entrepreneurial, even though large 
numbers of DBFs everywhere have neither products nor profits. 
 
What does this signify? In an earlier paper, an extensive analysis of the response by 
the large number of non-megacentre, even non-bioscience regions in the USA, 
Canada and the UK was undertaken (Cooke, 2002b). This showed that fifteen US 
States had undertaken science base analyses and developed science strategies with 
targets and mechanisms for augmenting their capture of basic science funding in 
biosciences. Some piecemeal evidence of the outcomes of these are the statistics that 
show universities like Harvard, Johns Hopkins, UCSF, Stanford and Duke as 
occupying highest places in the NIH R&D allocations compared to hitherto. But the 
US has also an interesting mechanism for supporting ambitious if underdeveloped 
universities in lagging States to access national competitive funding. The EPSCOR 
scheme under the NSF competitive bidding procedure for accessing, first programme, 
now project funding allows designated States, e.g. Oklahoma and Mississippi to bid 
competitively for such bioscience research funding by lowering the grant aid 
qualifying bar below that expected of the rest of the USA. This, in EU terms, is a 
‘structural funds’ mechanism within the Framework Funds and it has produced 
generally positive rather than futile results in the USA. 
 
In Europe, some regional bodies have begun to develop regional science strategies, 
most notably Scotland that identifies its £800 million R&D spend annually and seeks 
to augment it through intra-regional collaboration and the furtherance of existing 
science-funding mechanisms. Medical and Biosciences are two if the three funding 
areas to be targeted. In Finland a central government policy of seeding regional 
Centres of Expertise, and later, Centres of Excellence has produced up to six regional 
bioscientific Centres of Excellence that follow the US system of linking exploration 
to exploitation but through largely public rather than private knowledge exploitation 
mechanisms. Regional governance institutions are now somewhat more aware now 
than they were until only very recently, that health is a large part of their economy, 
that it links directly to some of the most exciting science being done in the world 
today, and that as well as making a direct economic contribution through purchasing   29
and employment, it can make an important indirect contribution to economic welfare 
through possible academic and corporate spin-out activities. It is likely that regional 
analysis and policy will be more rather than less influenced by issues such as those 




These are brief and orientated towards future implications for regional science and 
policy rather than being a simple reprise of what has been said. First, of significance 
to the never-ending debate about the viability of SMEs in a globalising world 
dominated by multinational firms, events during the past decade or so show just how 
misplaced arguments prophesying the demise of SME significance can be. It is ‘big 
pharma’ that is in crisis as its traditional expertise in fine chemistry is subverted by 
the molecular biology revolution and the demand for transdisciplinary teams of DBFs 
to form project-based networks to seek ‘rational drug design’ solutions based on 
reagents and their inhibitor compounds at the molecular and even sub-molecular 
levels. Meanwhile ‘big pharma’s’ drug innovation pipeline dries up as R&D costs 
escalate, giving a further imperative to externalise projects to the ‘knowledge value 
chain’. DBFs in turn rely effectively upon the deep pockets of ‘big pharma’ for 
licensing cash, marketing and distribution. Some DBFs are now quite large and one 
(Celltech) recently bought a mid-size ‘pharma’ (Medeva) in the UK. Other global 
‘pharma’ has been merging at pace recently as they seek to reap one-off shareholder 
value from reducing the competition as Glaxo, Pfizer, Wyeth, Aventis and Novartis to 
name a few, testify. The regional science implications of these shifts towards public 
R&D exploration and exploitation and away from ‘big pharma’s’ traditional 
metropolitan redoubts require swift and serious analysis. 
 
In regional policy terms, the new model is more foresight-driven, more collaborative, 
based on shared vision and leadership than old redistributive policy used to be. This is 
necessarily policy for securing ‘generative growth’ (Cooke, 2002c). It must take 
seriously the long-established presence of hospitals and universities and seek to forge 
links along the biosciences value chain. It must do this in a sometimes hostile 
environment in which national or federal governments prefer to see a few Centres of 
Excellence, possibly not too far away from their seats of government, rather than in   30
obscure and peripheral regions. Yet policy-makers in precisely such regions will 
surely seize upon the obvious notion that for once in history public sector investments 
are new sources of innovative development and generative growth, seeking ways of 
mobilising enterprising coalitions to bid for infrastructure and ‘star’ scientist 
recruitment from a variety of funding sources. Or, if this is insufficient, pressing their 
multi-level governance structures for affirmative research allocation action such as 
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